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Possible Iraqi M	Military Action Against Syria	
	Points for the DDCI September 1983	
Summary		
	wag gould be induced to the top to the	
reopening of the Iraqi oil pipe credibly threaten Syria. The ent front and most vital Syrian targe fighter aircraft. Iraqi Presiden domestic criticism over the war we would not risk attacking Syria and tool of the Israelis. The Iraque Syria, rather than forcing Syrovoke Damascus into destroying scheme in which Iraq's vulnerabil	raq could be induced to attack Syria to force line. Iraq lacks the military capability to ire Iraqi Army is tied down along the Iranian ts are near the limits of the ranges of Iraqi t Saddam Hussein, already vulnerable to ith Iran, will not risk a two front war. re able to tie down Syria's forces, Saddam d appearing in the eyes of the Arab world as is almost certainly realize that any attack ia to reopen the pipeline, likely would it. Finally, we doubt Iraq would trust a ity to Syrian retaliation is linked to	
[srael's attacking Syrian forces	along the Colon. They would support to any	
sucker them into attacking Syria,	along the Golan. Irag would expect Israel to	25
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gucker them into attacking Syrian forces sucker them into attacking Syria,  Iraqi Military Capabilities  Ground Forces  Iraq has an army of 600	along the Golan. Irag would expect Israel to	25
Ground Forces  Iraq has an army of 600 Syria. The Iraqis and sartillery.  All of Iraqi's 20 divisors	along the Golan. Iraq would expect Israel to then do nothing themselves.  ,000 troops, nearly three times that of Syrians are nearly equal in armor and ions, however, are stationed along the few Iraqi police and border guard units are	25
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	launched an attack against Syria, Iran would launch an offensive against the Iraqi forces still on the Iranian border.	
ī	Even if Baghdad was willing to send forces to the Syrian border, the most we estimate it could spare would be about two divisions approximately 30,000 troops. This would be insufficient to significantly threaten the Syrians.	
	Iraq would be aware that it actually would have to invade Syria to have an effect, thus raising the possibility of becoming bogged down in a two front war. In 1976 Iraq deployed some 75,000 troops along the Syrian border and made threatening statements to the Syrians over Lebanon. The Syrians simply ignored the Iraqis.	
· (	Moreover, Iraqi ground forces could seize neither the entire length of the pipeline nor Syrian installations of sufficient value to force Damascus to reopen the pipeline. The major Syrian dam on the Euphrates, as an example, is some 250 kilometers from Iraq, too far for Iraqi ground forces. The most the Iraqis could hope to seize are some minor oil fields in northeast Syria and a few small border towns.	
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Air	<u>Force</u>	
(	Iraq has some 400 operational fighter and bomber aircraft, about eight times as many operational aircraft as Iran.	
1	We estimate Iraq could spare some 200 fighter and bomber aircraft for attacks against Syria. The Iraqis, who depend heavily on their Air Force to defeat Iranian ground attacks, probably would judge they could spare much less.	
9	Even if the Iraqis used 200 aircraft against Syria, they would be significantly outnumbered by the approximately 500 operational Syrian fighter aircraft.	
1	Moreover, most important Syrian targets are in the western third of the country, near the limits of the ranges of the Iraqi aircraft and heavily defended by Syrian surface-to-air missile sites.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Israeli Inv	volvement	
V V	An Iraqi attack on Syria is militarily feasible only if Israel ties down nearly all Syrian forces. Unless Israel actually goes to war with Syria, however, Iraq would risk being left alone in a two front war. Such a situation would be disastrous for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein who is already vulnerable to criticism for having led his country into the war with Iran.	

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